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INTRODUCTION 
Of all the recent attention given to the subject of Islamic law, 
perhaps the most unremarked upon, and yet also uncontested, 
observation is the extent to which the basic source material of the 
law, the vast compendia of norms and rules developed by medieval 
Muslim jurists—herein referred to as shari’a1—have been rendered 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. My 
gratitude and thanks extends in particular to Frank Vogel, Kilian Bälz, and 
Mahmoud El Gamal for their stimulating presentations, which provided the 
inspiration for this modest essay. As the essay is my own creation, I take full 
responsibility for all characterizations and errors present herein. 
 1. I am (intelligently and thoughtfully) criticized for often defining this vast 
and contradictory body of norms and rules developed by medieval jurists as 
shari’a, rather than fiqh. See, e.g., Patrick S. O’Donnell, Divine Law (Shari’ah) 
and Jurisprudence (Fiqh) in Islam, RATIO JURIS: LAW, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY (A 
MEMBER OF THE JURISDYNAMICS NETWORK) (June 26, 2009, 10:58 AM), 
http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2009/06/divine-law-shariah-jurisprudence-fiqh.html. 
It is true that the latter term is often used to describe the substantive rules derived 
by such jurists. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND 
FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 23-24 (1998) (distinguishing between 
shari’a as the immutable Divine Law and fiqh as human efforts to capture that law 
through scholarly interpretation). Yet at the same time my own realist 
predispositions lead me to the conclusion that if shari’a is meant to refer to nothing 
beyond a perfect and immutable Divine Law separate and apart from any human 
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obsolete by modernity.2 To be sure, this is not the case in all positive 
law in the modern Muslim nation state. Much to the chagrin of the 
portion of Muslim society enamored with modern conceptions of 
women’s rights, both family law and the law of inheritance remain 
firmly based in shari’a discourse in most Muslim majority nations.3 
 
effort to understand that law, then almost as a matter of epistemological necessity 
it means precisely nothing that can be known and is of no value to lawyers. Shari’a 
is not advanced even in American academic circles in such abstract terms, hence 
the insistence of Professor Feldman, for example, that the Iraqi constitution urges 
its legislature to “deploy the shari’a,” a statement that is meaningless unless 
shari’a is in some way humanity’s concretization of the Divine. See Noah 
Feldman, Response to Hamoudi, 2 MIDDLE E. L. & GOV’T J. 104, 105 (2010). This 
is to say nothing of the manner in which shari’a is used in modern Muslim 
discourse, where it absolutely includes references to some legal content. See, e.g., 
CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE 
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI’A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180 (2006) 
(quoting Case no. 7/1993/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt)). Finally, and 
most appropriately for our purposes, the ubiquitous references to “shari’a-
compliant . . . financ[e]” confers upon shari’a a binding set of rules, not 
unknowable aspects of the Divine. Joseph DiVanna, Guest Column, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 13, 2010, 11:42 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fb0eab76-064b-11e0-976b-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BVCMVkld. Accordingly, I find my own definition of 
shari’a, while admittedly contestable, nevertheless the most appropriate one to 
describe the corpus of the positive rules commonly referred to as “Islamic law,” 
particularly in the area of Islamic finance. 
 2. See BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 188 (1998) 
(describing the adoption of civil, criminal, commercial, and other legal codes in 
Muslim countries, as a result of European colonialism, that modified or replaced 
traditional Islamic law); Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: 
Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 791-92 
(2004) (pointing to a scholar’s flaw in applying traditional Islamic criminal law to 
contemporary situations when the courts of Islamic countries have adjudicated 
cases based on European criminal law for centuries); Haider Ala Hamoudi, The 
Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 295-97 (2010) (indicating 
that Islamic states commonly adopt and apply laws transplanted from Western 
societies even though Islamist rhetoric insists that the law should be Divine rather 
than man-made). 
 3. WEISS, supra note 2, at 188; see Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 297 (contrasting 
Islamists’ willingness to adopt man-made law in corporate law, contracts, and torts 
with Islamists’ adamant obstruction of amendments or developments to family 
law, where they believe Divine law is necessary); see also Abu-Odeh, supra note 
2, at 792 (referencing liberal use of Islamic law in family law matters). But see 
JUDITH E. TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW 65-83 (2008) 
(acknowledging changes to traditional Islamic family law as reformists attempt to 
reconcile a Qur’an-based view of marriage with modern marriage ideals); 
Baudouin Dupret, What is Islamic Law?: A Praxiological Answer and an Egyptian 
Case Study, 24 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 79, 88-90 (2007) (acknowledging that 
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Beyond this, the record is far more mixed, with some states adopting 
portions of shari’a in an otherwise thoroughly modern criminal 
code,4 or recognizing the continuation of the Islamic religious 
endowments known as the waqf.5 
It is in the area of private law beyond family law and inheritance, 
however, where shari’a suffered the most dramatic decline.6 In the 
vast majority of Muslim nations, shari’a rules of contract, tort, and 
most particularly partnership (including corporate law) were 
displaced by transplanted European law to such an extent that most 
Muslim lawyers in the Muslim world probably do not understand the 
medieval system in the slightest, much less be able to practice within 
any system that remotely resembled it.7  
These core facts provide pivotal context to understand the 
relatively recent surge of interest in Islamic finance.8 While interest 
 
modern judges applying family law are thoroughly bureaucratized administrative 
officials of a modern nation-state who apply a particular version of shari’a that is 
tied to a set of procedural rules and professional responsibilities, leading them to 
approach their tasks entirely differently than a traditional Islamic judge from 
another era). 
 4. See generally RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
155-73 (2005) (detailing the history of the movements and legislation that 
incorporated Islamic law into the criminal codes of Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, 
and northern Nigeria, or applied Islamic law alongside secular criminal laws). 
 5. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Carpet Merchants, 
and the Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim 
Experience, 1 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83, 107 (2008) (illustrating 
that the definitions of certain legal entities are rooted in shari’a, such as the 
“waqf,” which can be translated as a Muslim charitable trust). 
 6. See Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 323-25 (asserting that Islamists neither 
challenged the promulgation and application of civil and common law nor insisted 
on the use of shari’a for private law matters, most specifically in the commercial 
law context). 
 7. See id. at 311 (calling attention to the fact that the legal education of the 
judiciary in Islamic states encompasses the civil and common law and not the 
shari’a). But see id. at 309-10 (suggesting that even though shari’a is becoming 
less relevant in private law, some Islamic concepts continue to survive the 
transplantation of European law—most specifically the shari’a concept of the 
waqf, or land trust, which continues to remain in the modern Civil Code). 
 8. See Kenneth Silber, The Rise of Islamic Finance, RESEARCH MAG. (Sept. 1, 
2008), http://www.advisorone.com/article/rise-islamic-finance (noting the rise of 
interest in Islamic finance among Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly when 
lenders can employ certain methods to overcome shari’a’s prohibition on interest); 
see also IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2000) 
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in shari’a as it concerns private law (beyond family law) has 
generally declined within the broader Muslim polity to the point that 
the rules are not only obsolete, but also largely unknown, Islamic 
finance stands as a stark exception. It is an area of growing 
importance and relevance, and one that purports to be an application 
and modern resurrection of shari’a.  
Admittedly, it is in large part a voluntary adherence to shari’a 
rather than a state-mandated one, as Islamic finance transactions in 
all but a handful of countries are not required by state law but rather 
ensured through a form of voluntary compliance, in a manner that 
will be addressed later in this essay.9 However, that solution hardly 
resolves the difficulty. Even positing that the practice is to be 
voluntary, how does one go about crafting rules and limitations to 
govern a deeply and fundamentally contemporary practice using 
source material that is medieval in its origin? This is not, after all, 
some sort of effort to revert to shari’a in all private law matters—
that would preclude any notion of legal personality, corporate limited 
liability, or general theory of contract.10 Islamic banks rely on every 
single one of these concepts of modernity and it seems obvious to 
say that they could not survive otherwise. The rise of Islamic finance 
is instead an effort to create sensible rules of application for modern 
financial institutions on the basis of particular medieval rules that 
 
(noting that the first Islamic banks did not exist until the 1970s, but have since 
expanded operations to over seventy countries and have forty times the assets they 
did in the early 1980s). 
 9. See, e.g., Kristin Smith, The Kuwait Finance House and the Islamization of 
Public Life in Kuwait, in THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 168, 182 (Clement M. 
Henry & Rodney Wilson eds., 2004) (illustrating how the Kuwait Finance House, 
the second largest bank in Kuwait, adheres to shari’a by maintaining a voluntary, 
rather than mandatory, system of complying with the Kuwait Central Bank, even 
though this voluntary scheme entails a number of institutional drawbacks); see also 
Edna Fernandes, Sharia Law UK: Mail on Sunday Gets Exclusive Access to a 
British Muslim Court, DAILY MAIL (July 4, 2009, 9:57 PM), http://www.daily 
mail.co.uk/news/article-1197478/Sharia-law-UK--How-Islam-dispensing-justice-
side-British-courts.html# (illustrating the rare changing tide in the United Kingdom 
to move from voluntary compliance with shari’a court rulings on financial 
disputes, to mandatory compliance by enforcing the shari’a court judgments 
through the state’s civil courts). 
 10. E.g., Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 309 (pointing out the substantive legal 
problems with the Mecelle (Ottoman Civil Code) operating as a continental civil 
code, given its lack of “any concept of legal personhood” or notion of limited 
liability companies). 
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hardly seem relevant to modernity.11 Ultimately, what the practice 
purports to do, its entire justificatory framework, lies in the 
resurrection of (selectively decided upon) rules of shari’a applied in 
a commercial and economic environment that bears no resemblance 
to that which existed at the time the rules were developed.12  
To say that this challenge raises any number of thorny theoretical 
questions difficult to resolve is an understatement. The most obvious 
is the irony of the selectivity. For example, why may an Islamic bank 
enjoy legal personality in derogation of shari’a but may not take 
interest on a loan? This question, however, is a debate for another 
time and place, as it involves considerations well beyond those of 
Islamic finance alone.13 
More to our purposes, precisely what is the Islamic methodology 
that is to be applied so as to glean, from disparate sets of juristic 
compendia spanning hundreds of years, a set of methodologically 
sound principles that might become the bedrock of a modern 
financial practice? More centrally, who will be entrusted to apply 
those principles to develop the relevant rules? Finally, will whatever 
hybrid creature that emerges from this primordial soup of rules, 
sacred texts, and purposes serve as an example for any attempt to 
resurrect other areas of Islamic law, either in terms of methodology 
or the location of institutionalized authority?  
These questions are not easy to answer, and it is a testament to 
their difficulty that they are still being grappled with. Fortunately, the 
July 27, 2010 plenary session of the XVIIIth Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law, the subject of this 
 
 11. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On 
the Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 436 
(2008) (“A modern legal code cannot truly be made from hundreds of 
contradictory juristic texts spanning over a thousand years, particularly when, as in 
matters of commerce and finance, the texts deal largely with material that is either 
irrelevant or deeply offensive to modern sensibilities . . . .”). 
 12. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and 
Function in Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 605, 610 (2007) (describing the 
shortcomings of the methodology of the modern jurisprudence in developing a 
uniform set of rules). 
 13. I have discussed elsewhere the rather odd selectivity of legal areas in which 
Islamist groups appear to engage. Some obvious departures from shari’a are 
ignored (such as the universal modern prohibition against slavery), while others are 
deemed indispensable (such as money interest on a loan).  
1112 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
essay, provided an ideal opportunity to explore such matters in 
greater depth and included a panel of speakers that was as diverse as 
it was distinguished.14 While each speaker spoke to his own area of 
interest and expertise, and each focused on a disparate aspect of 
Islamic finance, what united the presentations can be brought back to 
what might be called a core aspect of modern Islamic finance—what 
is its relationship to the shari’a, and who gets to decide core 
questions of Islamicity? This essay shall explore each presentation in 
more detail to highlight the ways in which these ideas manifest 
themselves in different aspects of Islamic finance and its alternatives. 
I. PROFESSOR FRANK VOGEL AND THE NATURE 
OF ISLAMIC LAW 
Professor Vogel’s initial contribution framed the question 
presented in this essay with far more historical nuance and with 
reference to the substance of the shari’a itself. Professor Vogel’s 
primary task was to narrate the manner in which Islamic law 
developed positive rules and the manner in which those rules might 
be used to construct, or in this case to resurrect, a framework of 
regulation.15  
As would be appropriate in any exposition on law in a foreign 
context, Professor Vogel centers the conversation squarely on the 
matter of authority. In other words, and to expand on his ideas in a 
manner relevant to this essay, Muslims consider that under core 
theological principles, Islam’s holiest texts arise from God and are 
provided to humanity in the form of Revelation to the Prophet 
Muhammad.16 Without more, under this reduced paradigm, the only 
source material of the law is the Revealed Book of God, the Qur’an, 
and the example of the Prophet himself in the form of his deeds, 
 
 14. The XVIIIth International Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law, INT’L ACAD. COMP. L., http://www.iuscomparatum.org/141 
_p_4109/washington-congress-2010.html (last visited July 1, 2011). 
 15. Frank Vogel, Former Dir., Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law 
School, Remarks at the Islamic Finance Plenary Session of the XVIIIth 
Proceedings of the International Academy of Comparative Law (July 27, 2010) 
[hereinafter Vogel Presentation] (transcript on file with American University 
International Law Review). 
 16.  M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, 
Interpretation and Rule-Making, 1 U.C.L.A. J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 147-48 
(2002) (describing core conception of revelation in the Islamic tradition).  
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words, and utterances, known as the Sunna.17 Following this 
paradigm, without elaboration, any number of Muslims reflexively 
and seemingly un-contemplatively “hurl”18 pieces of the Sunna at 
one another to demonstrate the obvious truth of some principle or 
other, in a manner entirely disassociated from any political context or 
any ethical framework. 
As a historical matter, and among Muslims who take their 
doctrinal traditions seriously, the matter is not such an “exegetical 
free-for-all,”19 and the question Vogel chooses to focus on is not 
what the source material of the law should be, nor even the 
methodology used to interpret the source material (though that is of 
some importance), but rather who will be entrusted with its 
interpretation? In short, who may undertake the effort, referred to in 
Arabic as ijtihad, to derive the rules from the source material?20 
Professor Vogel then initiated the analysis and began with 
Schacht’s well-known statement that Islamic law represents an 
“extreme case of a ‘jurists’’ law.”21 Stated more fully, as the shari’a 
developed, its substance was not decided by a political authority, 
such as a caliph, nor by state officials, such as a judiciary, nor by any 
other sort of state sanctioned body,22 but rather by particular schools 
 
 17. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 2 
(1950) (defining the Sunna as the behavior and traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad and stating that the two recognized sources of Islamic law are the 
Qur’an and the Sunna); Russell Powell, Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory 
and Economic Policy from Islamic Jurisprudence, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 43, 50-51 
(2007) (describing the various canonical texts of Sunna in the Sunni tradition that 
are used to interpret the Qur’an and that supply a large body of legal precedent in 
Islamic law). 
 18. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM 
THE EXTREMISTS 90 (2005) (using Ghazali’s metaphor, made famous in the 
English language by El Fadl, to refer to the attempts of particular modern 
fundamentalists, untrained in legal theory and analysis, to apply the law by 
“hurling traditions at their opponents to score cheap points”). 
 19. ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR 
AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 68 (2009) (using the phrase to describe the process 
of examining religious rules without considering a religion’s doctrinal 
underpinnings). 
 20. See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 16, at 153 (describing ijtihad as 
developing a legal opinion based on the sources of law). 
 21. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 209 (1982). 
 22. See LOMBARDI, supra note 1, at 49-54 (presenting the Islamic argument for 
a revival of the theory that a political authority can promulgate rules for the greater 
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of thought entirely divorced from state control. Ultimately, four such 
schools emerged in the Sunni tradition, described accurately as 
guilds by the late Professor George Makdisi because of their 
institutional similarity to that Western medieval institution.23 
Individual jurists within each guild developed vast compendia of 
rules derived within their respective schools, and it is the sum corpus 
of these contradictory, varying, and immense compendia that form 
the substance of the rules from which Islamic law is derived. 
The problem is that, with the advent of the colonial era, the juristic 
schools lessened in importance and ultimately disappeared in large 
parts of the Muslim world.24 To compound the difficulty, with the 
rise of the nation-state came not only transplanted law, but also 
transplanted political institutions and bureaucratic and administrative 
procedures. This process began as late as the end of the eighteenth 
century,25 and was therefore long complete by the creation of the first 
Islamic banks near the end of the twentieth century. 
So then, what is an emerging “Islamic” financial practice to do in 
order to make determinations respecting the shari’a compliance of 
its activities? There appears to be at least three options. First, one 
could adopt the ideas of one particular school of thought. However, 
such an approach is fundamentally limiting in terms of acceptable 
rules that may be derived, and it appears antiquated because the 
schools, as vibrant rulemaking institutions, no longer exist. Second, 
 
public good, thus enabling the state to enact positive law while shari’a retains a 
function within the state). But see Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 328-32 (questioning 
whether states can sensibly and with internal consistency retain a role for shari’a 
in the Islamic state, while also enacting positive law that may contradict shari’a, 
such as legislation that promotes women’s rights). 
 23. See SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪ 103-04 (1996) 
(explaining and critiquing Professor Makdisi’s claim that the Sunni’s madhhabs, or 
schools of legal thought, satisfied the criteria for guilds because they were 
professional, took up a specific economic sector, strictly regulated who could 
receive licenses to teach and give legal opinions, were independent from 
government, used a hierarchical structure, and were led by a headman). 
 24. See EL FADL, supra note 18, at 35-37 (detailing the systematic 
nationalization, secularization, and limits to legal education imposed upon shari’a 
schools that led to the schools closing or producing only religious ministers rather 
than jurists). 
 25. See id. at 26 (explaining that the process began with the “age of 
colonialism”). 
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some fusion of the four schools could be undertaken. But, would 
such an approach even be defensible, given that each school, at least 
in theory, developed rules according to a distinct set of 
methodological doctrinal principles, not susceptible of being stitched 
together artificially after a period of centuries to address modern 
concerns? Third, perhaps an entirely fresh approach is warranted. 
The original sacred text could be reinterpreted in a way that 
derogates from earlier juristic rules—a process Abduh referred to as 
the reopening of the gates of ijtihad?26  
Professor Vogel has indicated that the approach of Islamic finance 
has generally chosen the second of the three options above. That is, 
finance rules are selected from among all four schools on largely 
functional principles, favoring rules that operate best under modern 
circumstances.27 Elsewhere Professor Vogel indicated that this 
functional drive is balanced against a need to not de-contextualize 
individual rules or “patch” them together in a manner that deprives 
the Islamic system of what he refers to as its “internal logic.”28 The 
qualification is necessary, for it would not be difficult to create from 
the disparate fabric of over a millennium of juristic rules a set of 
principles that satisfy any interpreter, whether he is Vladimir Lenin, 
Milton Friedman, or Osama Bin Laden. The solution lies in the 
putative balance of logic on the one side and utilitarian selection on 
the other. 
However, the idea of adopting rules from four schools on the basis 
of the methods described above does leave open the very question of 
authority with which his presentation began. That is to say, in the 
absence of juristic schools, one might well ask who will be entrusted 
with this task of determining what is legitimate functional choice and 
what is irresponsible patching together of de-contextualized rules. 
This would be a problem regardless of which rules were adopted, but 
 
 26. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad’s Social Justice or Muslim Cant: 
Langdellianism and the Rise of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 89, 127-28 
n.225 (2007) (illustrating the broad scope of reforms that may be needed in order 
to resurrect the development of legal rules, such as the “expansive use of reason” 
to promote Islamic “solutions to the problems of modern society”). 
 27. Vogel Presentation, supra note 15. 
 28. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 37-38 (cautioning against constructing 
legal rules that are replicas of Western legal rules by picking and choosing 
preferred rules in a de-contextualized fashion). 
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when the methodology is to synthesize disparate sets of rules into a 
whole that never previously existed, the problem becomes 
particularly acute. 
The point, to be clear, is not that such determinations will not be 
subject to criticism by academics who will claim that they are less 
reflections on sacred text than responses to external economic and 
ideological stimuli operating in the relevant social space, though that 
is an assertion I have made in other contexts.29 Rather, the point is 
that perceptions of legitimacy within the community will certainly 
depend on the extent to which those doing the interpreting, and the 
synthesizing of rules from among the four schools, are deemed to be 
authentic. 
This was not a question that Professor Vogel sought to answer, nor 
should it have been. His remarks were not designed to provide 
solutions, but only to raise the proper questions in Islamic finance, a 
matter he undertook with considerable success. 
II. DR. KILIAN BÄLZ AND BROADER LESSONS 
FOR ISLAMIC LAW 
Dr. Bälz picked up with the very question of authority that 
Professor Vogel left open.30 To Dr. Bälz, this question of authority in 
Islamic finance, and the matter of who determines Islamicity, is the 
central question with which to grapple.  
In this context, the voluntary nature of Islamic finance is of 
fundamental importance because it removes the state, the judiciary, 
and the jurists as the agents of legal change or as the authority 
responsible for interpreting shari’a.31 The practice is not based on 
state law, as the contracts pursuant to which Islamic finance is 
 
 29. See Hamoudi, supra note 11, at 437-38 (criticizing “internal logic” in 
shari’a as merely a confirmation of a particular preexisting set of ideological and 
normative commitments). 
 30. Kilian Bälz, Partner, Amereller Legal Consultants, Remarks at the Islamic 
Finance Plenary Session of the XVIIIth Proceedings of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter Bälz Presentation] (transcript on 
file with American University International Law Review). 
 31. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR 
STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI‘A 293 (2008) (positing that enforcing 
mandatory compliance of shari’a is not within the duties of the state because 
shari’a is inherently diverse where state authority is uniform). 
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organized are governed by foreign law (often New York or English 
law), marginalizing the role of state officers to make many 
determinations about the content of Islamic law. This is doubly so 
because of the frequency of arbitration clauses rendering the judge’s 
role an exceedingly marginal one.32 
There is a reason that this has been undertaken, and state influence 
has been minimized. The driving concern among practitioners is not 
that state courts and state officials will ignore shari’a, but that 
shari’a will be given undue attention. There is a clear fear that if a 
particular financial structure is carefully established by practitioners 
and agents of Islamic finance, and a court is given an opportunity, it 
may gleefully dispute the Islamicity of the structure and declare it 
invalid under core Islamic principles. This problem is particularly 
acute in the Islamic finance context given the approach the practice 
has undertaken, as described effectively by Professor Vogel, to 
develop its rules of practice. If, after all, what we have in Islamic 
finance is a rather artificial synthesis of disparate rules of four 
medieval Islamic schools patched together by some sort of internal 
logic, it would not be difficult for a judge to reach an entirely 
different conclusion on how the synthesis should have been 
undertaken, and to disallow a structure that violated that judge’s own 
vision.  
The prospect that this may occur, and the dangers it creates 
respecting enforceability, were described by Dr. Bälz appropriately 
as “shari’a risk,” meaning that the invocation of shari’a is the 
perceived bar to enforceability, not the mechanism by which it will 
be enforced.33 The danger is considerable enough that not only is 
New York law chosen (so as to ensure that the contract is enforced 
according to its terms), but also there is an increasing proliferation of 
what Dr. Bälz referred to as “Waiver of Shari’a Defense” clauses, 
which prevent the parties from being able to assert in court that the 
transaction in question is not compliant with shari’a as a defense to 
enforceability.34 This concept led Dr. Bälz to characterize Islamic 
finance not so much as a legal practice, but as one derived from 
ethics.  
 
 32. See Bälz Presentation, supra note 30. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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While Dr. Bälz is clearly on to something, this terminology can be 
criticized; ethics are generally understood as standard-driven maxims 
of loose applicability whose purposes are not thwarted by formal 
evasion.35 Islamic finance is replete with formal artifices to avoid 
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited and is designed for 
the specific purpose of rule avoidance, which is hardly characteristic 
of most ethical frameworks.36 The simplest and most controversial 
example is the tawarruq, a form of synthetic sale and markup where 
the bank buys a particular item from a straw man and sells it at a 
markup reflecting prevailing interest rates to the borrower. The 
balance is to be paid in installments over the course of a particular 
period of time, but well before this, in fact immediately after its 
initial purchase, the item is resold for cash to the original seller for its 
original price, with no time elapsing between the three sales (straw 
man to bank, bank to borrower, and borrower back to straw man). 
The item never leaves its warehouse, and the borrower receives a 
sum certain in cash with an obligation to pay it back to the bank at a 
higher rate that corresponds precisely to market rates.37 One could 
criticize such an artifice as inauthentic or defend it as in keeping with 
formal rules, but it is hard to see precisely how one could argue that 
the practice has very much to do with ethics. Still, Dr. Bälz’s 
distinction between reliance on state law and private ordering is an 
apt one. 
As a result of this privatization of shari’a, the main set of 
institutions responsible for determining shari’a compliance, or the 
highly disembodied and dissolute authority to apply rules to govern 
financial transactions, are what is known as “shari’a review boards,” 
whose review and approval must be obtained for any transaction.38 
These are generally selected and approved by the practitioners 
 
 35. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 20 (Great 
Books Found. 1949) (1780) (explaining that ethics produces universal principles to 
which every person should strive, and there should be no exceptions to making 
those principles one’s own). 
 36. See Hamoudi, supra note 26, at 118 (claiming that Islamic financial 
institutions often depend on the complicated nature of the commercial structures in 
order to confuse Muslim consumers). 
 37. Id. at 119-20. 
 38. See Hamoudi, supra note 5, at 101 (explaining the significant role and 
binding nature of the shari’a review board, as a non-state actor, in judging 
compliance with shari’a). 
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designing the transaction. Equally important, however, and the true 
source of innovation, are the law firms, accounting firms, and 
investment banking institutions which create vehicles that conform to 
the requirements of the shari’a review boards and yet still meet 
consumer demands.39  
Equally relevant is the fact that this model of private ordering and 
reliance on non-state mechanisms and institutions could prove 
relevant in areas of private law, ranging from the Islamic law of 
contract (Dr. Bälz’s example) to the law of the family (my example), 
where Muslims—particularly in liberal states—refer matters of 
dispute to the local imam and address any disputes arising internally 
without state assistance or intervention. 
In other words, Dr. Bälz does offer us a solution to the conundrum 
of how to adopt medieval rules into a modern practice, largely by 
leapfrogging over matters of responsible methodology and arriving 
at the more fundamental question of locating a legitimate authority to 
undertake it. To Dr. Bälz, the truly fascinating and innovative aspect 
of Islamic finance is that the authority in question is in fact private 
and more intimately tied to the modalities of operation of 
international finance than any court.40 
III. PROFESSOR MAHMOUD EL GAMAL AND THE 
NEGLECTED MUSLIM POOR 
The one aspect left unaddressed by Dr. Bälz is the legitimacy of 
that disembodied and decentralized authority among the broader 
Muslim polity. Far from the self-financed guilds of jurists of the 
medieval era, these private actors are hired by the firms looking for 
transaction approval, often on a transaction by transaction basis, are 
paid by those firms, may be discharged by those firms, and generally 
are under confidentiality obligations not to disclose the details of the 
transactions on which they have worked.41 The lack of impartiality is 
obvious—quite clearly any shari’a review board member who 
developed a reputation for being obstinate or difficult would have a 
hard time finding work, while those who were more willing to be 
flexible and accommodating to the demands of the law firms and 
 
 39. But see Hamoudi, supra note 26, at 118. 
 40. Bälz Presentation, supra note 30. 
 41. Id. 
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banks responsible for hiring them would be financially rewarded for 
the same. This is hardly the basis upon which a broadly legitimate 
and independent interpretive authority can be established, a point Dr. 
Bälz did not contest.  
Professor El Gamal spent substantial time offering a critique along 
these lines. Professor El Gamal found no legitimacy in the 
institutions that comprised Islamic finance, and correspondingly, no 
authenticity to their means of deriving medieval rules.42 Professor El 
Gamal has moreover offered elsewhere a thoughtful alternative set of 
ideas to what he views as a more responsible way to understand 
shari’a as developed by the medieval jurists, and how to use the 
principles underlying their rules to create a more sensible system.43 
However, the focus of his presentation, in keeping with the themes of 
the other two participants, focused on the relationship between the 
methodology and the authority, rather than solely on matters of 
hermeneutics.44 
Professor El Gamal maintains that the practice of Islamic finance, 
and thus implicitly the authority underlying it, about which Dr. Bälz 
generally spoke in positive terms, has failed the broader Muslim 
community. There is always this danger whenever regulation of 
lawmaking institutions is left in private hands. While none could 
doubt that state officials have their own interests to protect, the 
interests of private actors, who stand to profit considerably if some 
interpretations are developed to the derogation of others, are 
comparatively larger. The risk that the rules will then be developed 
in a way that serves the interests of the financial classes alone 
thereby becomes quite a severe one.45  
 
 42. Mahmoud El Gamal, Professor of Economics, Rice Univ., at the Islamic 
Finance Plenary Session of the XVIIIth Proceedings of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter El Gamal Presentation] 
(transcript on file with American University International Law Review). 
 43. See generally Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, An Economic Explication of the 
Prohibition of Ribā in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence 1-18 (May 2, 2001), 
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/riba.pdf (arguing that medieval jurist ’Ibn 
Rushd’s rationale for prohibiting Ribā contains elements of modern economic 
theory, specifically relating to the maximization of economic efficiency). 
 44. El Gamal Presentation, supra note 42. 
 45. See Kilian Bälz, Visiting Scholar, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harv. L. 
School, Sharia Risk? How Islamic Finance Has Transformed Islamic Contract Law 
25 (May 1, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ 
ilsp/publications/balz.pdf) (pointing out that market forces and private actors 
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Thus, Professor El Gamal insists, the practice has developed in a 
manner not designed to protect or serve the Muslim public, but to 
maximize profit.46 The transaction must be structured in a manner 
that will appeal to Muslim consumers, but it could never be fairly 
said that shari’a review boards do very much to serve the broader 
Muslim polity or (Professor El Gamal’s focus) the Muslim poor. 
Given that the boards and the innovators of Islamic finance under Dr. 
Bälz’s paradigm are responsible for articulating a modern Islamic 
legal practice, the question raised by Professor El Gamal’s 
presentation is whether their disconnection from that polity and their 
intimate familiarity with international finance is not as much a 
hindrance as a benefit to ensure both authenticity and the continued 
viability of Islamic financial practice. 
Professor El Gamal’s solution accepts the reality of the private 
ordering that Dr. Bälz effectively lays out, for it seems inconceivable 
that Islamic finance is likely to be reorganized to serve primarily the 
Muslim poor.47 Rather, Professor El Gamal seeks to use private 
ordering as a means to serve the Muslim poor through a form of 
micro-financing that neither contravenes contemporary notions of a 
prohibition on interest, nor adopts for-profit financing mechanisms, 
relying instead on Islam-compliant commutative structures and 
mutual cooperatives that support economic development and are 
based on organic models in the region.48 
The thrust of the claim is that it works. Perhaps anticipating the 
critique that social justice financing initiatives are noble in their 
intentions but are hardly the basis for a sustained practice, Professor 
El Gamal spent much of his presentation offering a wealth of careful 
empirical information to show that the cooperative was successful, in 
 
determine how Islamic financial law develops even when the state dictates law 
reform generally or implements policies aimed at creating a purely Islamic state). 
 46. See id. at 24-26 (arguing that international commercial law heavily 
influences Islamic finance law). 
 47. See IMTIAZ B. ALI, WAQF: A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTION 
FOR MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 15 (2009), available at http://www.takaafultt.org/ 
images/WAQF_Book.pdf (explaining that the more recently proposed waqf micro-
financing system would likely only succeed in non-Muslim states with a minority 
population of Muslim poor because in states where Muslims are minorities there is 
a stronger need to develop their Muslim communities and protect and promote 
Islam). 
 48. El Gamal Presentation, supra note 42. 
 
1122 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
fact more successful than comparable micro-financing institutions.49 
This achievement possibly is due to its compliance with common 
understandings of shari’a as manifested in the modern world as well 
as its dedication to serving a Muslim underclass largely ignored by 
contemporary Islamic finance.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite nearly half a century of progress and an explosion of 
interest, Islamic finance appears to struggle with many of the 
problems common to most features of reinvigorated shari’a.50 These 
problems center around one essential and indeed existential 
difficulty. To be relevant and applicable in the modern world, shari’a 
requires reinvigoration of fresh ideas to decide which of the historic 
rules will be used to maintain what Professor Vogel would call 
Islamic “internal logic.” Yet for change to occur in any legal 
tradition, much less a religiously based one, it requires a legitimate 
agent. Many of the disputes and disagreements in Islamic finance are 
mere manifestations of this problem. Dr. Bälz located legitimacy and 
authenticity in the private actors that control Islamic finance, where 
Professor El Gamal dismissed them as self-interested, engaged in 
acts of “shari’a-arbitrage” and therefore not the basis of a long-term 
sustainable practice. With shari’a, the problem is not necessarily a 
lack of fresh ideas, as evidenced by the speakers’ presentations. 
Indeed, the same might be said of other thinkers in other aspects of 
shari’a—Khaled Abou El Fadl respecting democracy,51 Abdullahi 
An Naim concerning secularism,52 and Andrew March concerning 
liberalism.53 The problem in Islamic finance tends to be the lack of 
an authority that can articulate and apply these fresh ideas to promote 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally Hamoudi, supra note 26, at 116-124 (explaining the failures 
of Islamic finance and discussing the dynamic complexities between traditional 
Islamic shari’a principles and modern international commercial law). 
 51. See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
DEMOCRACY 65-66 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004) (encouraging 
a “free society in which all Muslims can debate what constitutes Shari’ah”). 
 52. See generally AN NA’IM, supra note 31, at 4, 95 (arguing that Muslims will 
be able to voluntarily adhere to shari’a and not be forced to comply with a state-
endorsed artificially narrow conception of shari’a when they are in a secular state). 
 53. See generally MARCH, supra note 19, at 64, 71 (asserting that the 
framework of a liberal democracy is not necessarily opposed to Islamic principles 
and arguing a liberal justification for these principles). 
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a broader communal acceptance.54 That Islamic finance rules are 
intensely criticized as formalistic and illegitimate, by respected 
figures like Professor El Gamal,55 despite the fact that finance rules 
are among the most successful efforts at shari’a reinvigoration, 
illustrates how deep the problem runs. 
 
 
 54. See EL FADL, supra note 51, at 35-37 (showing why there may be a lack of 
modern Islamic legal scholars to promulgate new ideas). 
 55. See also Hamoudi, supra note 12, at 610 (expressing similar misgivings to 
Professor El Gamal on whether the modern application of shari’a accomplishes 
either the theoretical or practical goals that would help make traditional shari’a 
relevant in modern contexts). 
